Very recently, I spent some time reviewing the court’s judgment on VP v SP [2025] EWFC 447 (B). What stood out to me was not the size of the asset base or any novel legal principle, but how clearly the judgment highlights the realities that often determine outcomes in needs-driven financial remedy cases.

While I was going through the decision, I was struck first by the court’s firm handling of jurisdiction. Despite the case having reached a fully contested final hearing, the absence of a conditional order meant the court simply did not have the power to make a financial remedy order. There was no attempt to bend the rules or overlook these quencing. Instead, the judge gave a clear and carefully reasoned indication of the outcome, to take effect once jurisdiction was properly established. In my view, this was a sensible and principled approach, and a reminder that procedural discipline remains essential, however far proceedings have progressed.

Substantively, this was a classic needs-based case. The assets were modest and largely confined to the former matrimonial home. There was no surplus and no meaningful scope for a sharing exercise. What struck me here was that, despite this, the wife received inexcess of 70% of the available assets following a medium-length marriage. That outcome was driven by necessity.

At the centre of the court’s assessment was the parties’ adult son, who is profoundly disabled and wholly dependent on his mother. In my experience, cases involving adult dependent children are sometimes underestimated because the statutory priority afforded to minor children no longer applies. This judgment is a clear reminder that adult dependency remains a powerful factor in the assessment of needs. The mother’s lifelong caring role had extinguished her earning capacity, dictated her housing requirements, and justified long-term financial provision. The court was also realistic about the future, acknowledging that care needs in such circumstances are likely to increase rather than diminish.

Housing was approached with similar realism. It struck me that the court did not treat home ownership as an automatic goal. Even with a majority share of the equity, purchasing a property was not considered a workable solution that would meet the mother’s and her son’s needs. Renting, supported by capital, was therefore accepted as the fairand sensible outcome. By contrast, the husband’s needs were assessed incontext, including the potential, though not guaranteed, availability of support from an adult child. Needs were considered against real-world circumstances, not in isolation.

The court’s treatment of conduct also merits attention from practitioners of my field. Despite findings of domestic abuse in related proceedings, the judge declined to make adjustments under section 25(2)(g) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. I honestly believe this reinforces an important point practitioners often need to explain to clients: the threshold for conduct-based financial adjustment remains high, and not every troubling history will translate into a financial consequence.

In my view, this case reinforces that adult dependent children can be outcome-determinative, that needs can and do override equality, and that courts will adopt pragmatic solutions to procedural obstacles without compromising jurisdictional integrity.

Looking ahead, this is a caselikely to be relied upon where care responsibilities are lifelong, assets are limited, and realism matters more than rhetoric. It underlines a simple but enduring truth in matrimonial finance: fairness is not measured in percentages, but in whether the outcome works for the lives being lived.

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